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Introduction 
Despite high expectations that the November 24 deadline for reaching 
a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran would be a firm deadline, the 
inability of the parties to reach an agreement, and the subsequent 
decision to extend the process for seven months did not really come as 
a surprise. The assumed wide gaps between the two sides on some of 
the most critical issues on the agenda would have been difficult to 
bridge in the final weeks and days. Because neither side wanted to 
declare the process a failure, an extension was almost inevitable, 
although the rather long duration of the extension – through the end of 
June 2015 – was unusual, especially in light of certain diplomats’ 
claims that agreement had already been secured on many of the issues.  
The November extension raises many questions about what exactly 
is going on in this negotiation, but analysts are making their 
assessments with a dearth of actual knowledge, because the 
negotiators are purposely keeping the proceedings under very tight 
wraps. So we actually have no way of knowing what percentage of the 
issues is nearing or has reached agreement, and where the parties 
remain very far apart. When we listen to the Iranians in the public 
domain – especially statements issued by Supreme Leader Khamenei – 
we hear mainly “no, no, no”, but Secretary of State Kerry tells us that 
“great progress” has been made. So what is the reality? A best guess 
would be somewhere in the middle, although probably much more is 
stuck than resolved, otherwise it is difficult to understand the need for 
an additional seven months. Moreover, there is absolutely no 
indication that Iran has made a strategic decision to back away from its 
military aspirations; indeed, it is doing everything possible to hold on 
to its breakout capability, and still secure sanctions relief. 
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Israel’s (surprising) sigh of relief 
For some the inability to achieve an agreement on November 24 was a 
keen disappointment, but for others the decision elicited at least a 
temporary sigh of relief. In the Middle East – certainly in Israel – the 
more dominant sentiment was no doubt relief. This might seem odd 
against the backdrop of long-standing fears in Israel that the 
negotiations are not progressing, and that Iran remains defiant. Israel 
believes that Iran is holding out for a deal that will keep it at breakout, 
while at the same time trying to ease the economic situation through 
lifting of sanctions. Because Iran is still moving forward on the nuclear 
front, Israel’s fear is that continuing on this route will ultimately render 
a reversal of Iran’s military nuclear aspirations increasingly difficult to 
achieve, to the point of impossible.  
Israel also doesn’t put much stock in the Interim Deal, especially 
because Iran made sure that the terms of the deal would not 
significantly undermine its current status with regard to breakout. 
Israel is very troubled by the fact that Iran is continuing with R&D into 
more and more advanced generations of centrifuges,1 and that the 
weaponization aspects of Iran’s program are not covered by the Interim 
Deal. Moreover, in the parallel negotiation between the IAEA and Iran, 
Iran remains intransigent, stonewalling on the IAEA’s different 
requests, including entry to the military facility at Parchin. And Iran is 
paying no price for this ongoing intransigence, because clearing up the 
PMD is currently outside the direct purview of the P5+1. 
Still, countries like Israel – that remain on the sidelines of the nego-
tiations and have no direct impact on the proceedings – are relegated to 
trying to influence the positions of those that do have a seat at the 
table, and weighing the alternatives. Because the breakdown option 
was not a realistic option for either the US or Iran, the alternatives in 
late November boiled down to either concluding a nuclear deal, or 
deciding on an extension of the negotiations. In the final weeks of 
negotiations, and in view not only of Iran’s ongoing intransigence but 
indications of P5+1 willingness to move toward Iran by conceding on 
different issues, it was clear that any deal reached would necessarily 
mean further P5+1 concessions, with the inevitable outcome of a bad 
nuclear deal. When compared to a bad deal, the extension option was 
clearly the better choice. An extension held the (albeit slim) hope of 
getting a better deal in the coming months, if more pressure is applied. 
A more cynical view would be that the sigh of relief from Jerusalem was 
primarily a reflection of what one feels when an inevitably bad 
                                                          
1  Enrichment of uranium to 20 percent, and development of new and faster 
centrifuges are functional equivalents as far as Iran’s prospective breakout 
capability. Both play the part of enabling Iran to make a quick dash to fissile 
material. This is why Iran could afford to stop enriching to 20 percent as long as it 
was allowed to continue working on the advanced centrifuges. 
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outcome is delayed, providing some breathing space before tough 
decisions will have to be made.  
It should be kept in mind that contrary to some assessments, Israel 
does have a clear interest in a negotiated deal. The alternatives to such 
a deal would be Israel taking military action or Iran becoming a nuclear 
state, neither very appealing to Israel, to say the least. Looking back 
over the course of the years since 2003, Israel’s prime ministers are on 
record with unequivocal support for diplomacy as the best means to 
rein in Iran, although Israel has also attempted to add a measure of 
deterrence vis-à-vis Iran with its own threats of military force against 
Iran’s nuclear facilities, if diplomacy fails. So although Israel has often 
been portrayed over the past year as not willing to accept any deal, this 
seems not supported by the evidence. In fact, it is hard to see where 
Israel would disagree with the US approach that the best way to 
prevent Iran from attaining nuclear weapons is through a “verified, 
negotiated deal.”2 The catch is that it must be a good deal, and there 
are differences of opinion over the definition of a good (and bad) 
nuclear deal. 
What the decision makers have been saying 
Interestingly, in official statements issued since the extension decision 
was announced, Israel’s specific security concerns seem to have 
receded somewhat from the forefront of the arguments presented. 
Earlier this year (first months of 2014) Prime Minister Netanyahu 
seemed more prone to hint at the possibility of Israel taking action to 
ensure its security. But in the months preceding the deadline, and once 
it passed, Israeli officials have chosen not to dwell on the threat that a 
bad deal would pose to Israel in particular. Instead, they have 
highlighted more general concerns tied to the scenario of a bad nuclear 
deal and to Iran’s continued nuclear ambitions. They emphasize the 
danger of Iran remaining at the nuclear threshold; the concern that it is 
continuing to pursue R&D on more advanced generations of 
centrifuges; fears of additional proliferation in the Middle East; and 
Iran’s work on developing ICBMs, that can only mean that the regime 
has military nuclear intentions.3    
A comparison of Netanyahu’s words at the AIPAC policy conference 
in March 2014, and his most recent address to the Saban forum in early 
                                                          
2  See Carol Morello, “Kerry predicts Iran nuclear talks will be settled long before June 
deadline” Washington Post, December 7, 2014. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kerry-predicts-iran-
nuclear-talks-will-be-settled-long-before-june-deadline/2014/12/07/72d18dc6-
7e58-11e4-9f38-95a187e4c1f7_story.html  
3  See statements by Netanyahu and Intelligence Minister Yuval Steinitz in Stuart 
Winer, “Israel nods in approval as Iran nuke talks extended” Times of Israel, 
November 24, 2014.  
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December, reveals a notable change of emphasis, from Israel’s specific 
concern to the global one. At the AIPAC policy conference Netanyahu 
said “letting the worst terrorist regime on the planet get atomic bombs 
would endanger everyone, and it certainly would endanger Israel since 
Iran openly calls for our destruction. 70 years ago our people, the 
Jewish people, were left for dead. We came back to life. We will never 
be brought to the brink of extinction again. As prime minister of Israel, 
I will do whatever I must do to defend the Jewish state of Israel.”4 At 
the Saban forum Netanyahu was focused on the avoidance of a bad 
deal, and Israel’s ability to have a positive influence in this regard, 
from the sidelines: “The November 24 deadline has come and gone. 
That’s fortunate. Because a deal was not signed that would have left 
Iran as a threshold nuclear power. Though Israel isn’t part of the P5+1, 
our voice and our concerns played a critical role in preventing a bad 
deal.”5 Netanyahu also advocated increasing the pressure on Iran. 
In between these two addresses, Netanyahu’s statements during an 
interview on BBC on the day the extension was announced are quite 
interesting – they contain an element of self-reliance, but not in the 
sense that Israel reserves the right to take military action. Rather, 
Netanyahu seemed to be referring to verbal action: voicing Israel’s 
concerns to the United States. This is in line with his later Saban forum 
statement about Israel’s role in convincing the P5+1 to avoid a bad 
deal: “Israel will continue to defend itself using its own resources. We 
are following the nuclear talks with Iran closely … and letting our views 
be known directly, via my contacts with the American administration 
and other heads of government. ”6 
The fact that Israel is less prone to putting its own threat perception at 
the forefront should not, however, be read as a sign of complacency or 
trust that a good deal will be achieved by the negotiators. On the 
contrary, Israeli officials have strongly emphasized the dangers ahead: 
Iran’s unwillingness to back away from its military ambitions, and the 
imperative to continue with the pressure of sanctions, which is the only 
reason that Iran came back to the table in October 2013.7 
                                                          
4  Netayahu’s address to the AIPAC policy conference, March 4, 2014. 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/full-transcript-of-netanyahus-aipac-address/  
5  Carol Morello, “Kerry predicts Iran nuclear talks will be settled long before June 
deadline” Washington Post,  December 7, 2014.  
6  “Netanyahu welcomes failure to reach Iran nuclear deal in Vienna”, Haaretz, 
November 24, 2014. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-
defense/.premium-1.628281.  
7  National Security Head Yossi Cohen said that the extension of the JPOA enables 
Iran to preserve and even increase its nuclear capabilities, while sanctions are in 
danger of collapse. Quoted in Herb Keinon, “Iran retains its nuclear capabilities as 
sanctions regime erodes, NSC chief says”, Jerusalem Post, December 7, 2014. 
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What role does Israel really play in confronting Iran?  
Israel’s role in the eleven year on-again, off-again negotiations with 
Iran over its nuclear program has long been the topic of considerable 
debate. Fundamentally, Israel has no direct role in this dynamic, nor 
does the responsibility for dealing with Iran’s nuclear ambitions rest on 
its shoulders.8 However, because Israel has long been the target of 
quite horrific rejectionist rhetoric from Iranian leaders, it has been hard 
for it to resist reacting to the threat; and since Netanyahu became prime 
minister, Israel has been much more vocal on this topic. Still, official 
statements warning that if diplomacy fails Israel may have to take 
military action in self-defense, have often been misread as implying an 
eagerness to do so. But there is not much to back that up.9 
In fact, these threats have been an attempt to deter Iran, adding to 
the other forms of pressure on this state – all with the goal of getting 
Iran to return to its NPT commitment and back away from its military 
aspirations. In 2012, it seems that Israel’s deterrence shored up a 
success – not vis-à-vis Iran, but rather the EU. It seems that EU fears of 
an actual Israeli attack helped to push the members closer to their 
decision to place an oil embargo on Iran. This was a drastic step from 
the EU’s point of view, but proved to be a crucial piece of the biting 
sanctions puzzle that the US and some of its allies put together in 2012.  
If we understand Israel’s concerns, and its acute frustration over the 
lack of success so far in negotiating with Iran – with Iran all the while 
pushing forward with its nuclear program – the question is what is 
helpful to the overall effort and what is not. If threats of military force 
did help to bolster P5+1 determination, that was a positive effect, but if 
they interfere with the US approach, they can become a liability – for 
the talks as well as for US-Israel relations. The changes in emphasis in 
Netanyahu’s rhetoric over the course of 2014 may be indicative of an 
understanding that Israel’s efforts are best directed to trying to 
convince P5+1 states of the worthiness of its positions. This would 
explain why Netanyahu played up the success of Israel’s efforts to warn 
of a bad deal in November.  Expressing self-reliance through verbal 
action seems a better course to follow, but if a bad deal is concluded, 
Israel will nevertheless face some tough decisions. 
                                                          
8  Emily B. Landau, “Iran: Not Israel’s role or responsibility”, Times of Israel, March 7, 
2012. http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/iran-not-israels-role-or-responsibility/    
9  Recently, US officials were quoted using unfortunately foul language to 
communicate their assessment that Netanyahu was never serious about employing 
military force. See Jeffrey Goldberg, “The crisis in US-Israel relations is officially 
here”, The Atlantic, October 28, 2014. 
  http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/10/the-crisis-in-us-
israel-relations-is-officially-here/382031/  
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Israel in broader context 
Israel seems to be in step with other states in the region, both regarding 
its concern that Iran could become nuclear weapons state as well as its 
preference for an extension at this juncture. Where Israel and these 
states – especially in the Gulf region – differ is that the Gulf states tend 
to be relatively quiet regarding their concerns, whereas Israel makes its 
positions known. But the implications of a possible nuclear Iran are 
dire across the region.  
Currently, the Middle East is experiencing multiple crises, and is 
near boiling point as far as the situation in Syria and Iraq. This has 
impacted the nuclear talks in that it elicited some calls in the US for 
getting a ‘quick nuclear deal’ so that the administration would be able 
to consider cooperation with Iran on any number of challenges in the 
Middle East. But so far the nuclear issue is still being treated in the 
main in its own right, as was proven by the latest decision to extend 
negotiations, rather than settle for a bad deal.  
Finally, while the focus of this article has been Israel’s reactions and 
calculations, it is important to keep in mind that the Iranian nuclear 
threat is first and foremost an issue of international security, with the 
continued viability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime on the line. 
While the Middle East is likely to suffer the initial effects of an Iranian 
nuclear capability, the extremely dangerous implications of this 
scenario have a global reach. 
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